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Economic Incentives and Disincentives:
A New Approach to Floodplain
Management
Floods are a serious problem in the United
States and, to date, most floodplain management
programs have been failures. Despite a massive
attack on the problem by various levels of
government, floods are inflicting larger total
and per capita losses than ever before.
Average annual property losses due to flooding
exceed two billion dollars (White et al.,
1973:3).
The floodplain is generally defined as the
area of land that would be inundated by the
worst flooding likely to occur in a hundred
year period. Approximately 9.5% of all cultiv-
able land, and 16.5% of all urban land, in the
United States lies within a floodplain (Mad-
dock, 1977:44). Furthermore, urban development
encroaches on 1.5% to 2.5% of the total flood-
plain area in this country each year, even
though much of this new development gains no
special benefit from a floodplain location. In
order to control further losses from flooding,
land use management would have to prevent 80-
90% of the uneconomic part of this expansion
(White et al
.
, 1973:xviii).
Public action in the management of flood-
plain use is necessary in order to protect the
public health, safety, and welfare. Most im-
portantly, floodplains are hazardous areas in
which to live, and occupants impose costs upon
themselves through the risk of death, injury,
dislocation, and loss of property. In many in-
stances occupants are aware of the risks invol-
ved with locating in a floodplain; however, new
buyers, renters, and other temporary residents
may be unaware of the risks if not warned of
the hazard.
Floodplain management is also important
because of the spillover costs, direct and in-
direct, which development of these areas im-
poses on society as a whole. Direct costs are
imposed as paving increases the amount of im-
pervious surface, thereby preventing infiltra-
tion of water into the soil. Buildings, roads,
dikes, and levees, which may block flows or end
up as debris, add to flood heights, velocity,
and erosive scouring. Fires, explosions, and
pollution may result from breached containment
of industrial chemicals stored or used in
floodplains.
The indirect spillover costs include the
costs of warning systems, evacuation, relief,
rehabilitation, and flood control structures.
Public utilities and services may need special
protection against floods and taxpayers who re-
side in the larger political entity, of which
the floodplains may be only a part, may have to
pay a portion of the extra costs. Costs are
also imposed on friends, relatives, taxpayers,
and charitable donors who provide aid to flood
victims.
A third concern in floodplain management is
that floodplains are often sensitive environ-
mental areas serving vital ecosystem functions.
They include estuaries, marshes, aquifer re-
charge areas, flats, or dunes. In addition,
floodplains are often associated with scenic,
wildlife, and recreational amenities requiring
buffer zones for protection. Tight alluvial
soils created by river floodwaters are poor
sites for disposal of wastes, either in septic
tanks or industrial waste containers.
TECHNIQUES FOR FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT
In the past, most floodplain management
efforts have been structure oriented. The
Army Corps of Engineers, alone, spends $500
million a year in capital costs for the con-
struction of flood control structures; that
figure does not include operation and mainte-
nance costs for previously built projects
(Kusler, 1976:1). Such structures are expen-
sive, disrupt the environment, are rarely paid
for by beneficiaries, and often provide only
limited protection while encouraging further
floodplain encroachment. Flood control dams
have not been successful in preventing the in-
crease in flood damage. In recognition of this
failure, the Water Resources Management Act of
1974 gave the Corps of Engineers authority to
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include non- structural alternatives in their
flood control strategies.
Some state and local governments have turn-
ed to direct regulation of land use in the
floodplains in an attempt to reduce flood
losses. These methods, which include zoning,
subdivision controls, building codes, and de-
signation of critical environmental areas,
have, for the most part, also proven ineffec-
tive. The laws are often weak, and enabling
legislation frequently contains clauses that
make it difficult to remove existing uses.
Strict regulation will be most effective in the
long run by reaching the root of the problem--
the encroachment of more and more of the flood-
plain by intensive uses.
Given the inadequacies of structural and
regulatory techniques, a new approach based on
economic incentives and disincentives may be
preferable. A system of taxes or subsidies
can be prepared that would limit development
to desirable activities without prohibiting it
altogether. The economic approach ensures
that those who reap the benefits of floodplain
development bear the risks and social costs of
using that land. This alternative, which is
more efficient, equitable, and effective than
direct regulation, has been virtually ignored
in the literature of floodplain management.
It has, however, been successfully applied in
controlling water pollution in Germany, and
has been proposed for limiting sulfur emissions
by major air pollution sources in the United
States.
This paper will focus on the elements of
effective floodplain management. Since other
researchers have dealt with the problems asso-
ciated with structural control measures
(James, 1968; Kusler, 1976; United States Gen-
eral Accounting Office, 197S; White et al
.
,
1975], I will emphasize the relative merits
and disadvantages of direct regulation vis a
vis the economic approach to floodplain
management.
THE OBJECTIVES OF FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT
Kusler (1976:110-113) identifies a number
of desirable characteristics for a successful
floodplain management program:
1. avoidance of losses to existing uses;
2. avoidance of losses to future uses;
3. congruence with the characteristics of
the natural and social systems of the
specific area;
4. consideration of regional welfare
objectives;
5. minimal environmental impact;
6. permanency of protection;
7. inherent safety;
8. feasibility of implementation;
9. inexpensive to formulate and operate;
10. low requirements for expertise and
personnel;
11. equitable incidence of benefits and
costs;
12. congruence with the demand for land and
supply of alternate sites;
13. ability to offer immediate control.
The choice of floodplain management policies
depends on the multiple objectives of national
and regional economic efficiency, equity, envi-
ronmental quality, and other aspects of social
well-being (Water Resources Council, 1973).
Political feasibility and administrative effec-
tiveness are also basic concerns affecting the
design of a floodplain management program.
Obviously, vested interests are likely to
oppose any regulation of the floodplain, and
any policy should be strong enough to overcome
the objections of these groups.
The equity objective demands that manage-
ment policies be fair to all concerned, al-
though that does not imply treating everyone
identically. A good policy will treat people
in similar situations in a similar manner,
while giving special consideration to the poor
and others facing special hardships as a result
of the policy. The objective of achieving
Many floodplains are sensitive environmental areas
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equity involves addressing the relations be-
tween the residents of the floodplain and those
in the region outside the floodplain, as well
as the relations among floodplain residents.
Environmental quality is another important
objective, whether it is interpreted with re-
gard to human values alone, or ecosystem func-
tioning values as well. In the first sense,
floodplains often are associated with scenic,
wildlife, and recreational amenities important
for enhancing the quality of life. In the
second sense, floodplains serve vital ecosystem
functions, such as aquifer recharge, or are im-
portant for the preservation of other sensitive
areas such as estuaries, marshes, or dune
systems.
Economic efficiency is concerned with the
maximization of social welfare at a given level
of resource expenditure. The concept goes be-
yond cost-effectiveness because the analyst
must determine the appropriate level of re-
source utilization. Even if a policy is econo-
mically efficient, it is not necessarily
desirable. Regional economic development, for
instance, can be a valid goal, even at the ex-
pense of national economic efficiency.
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND
FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT
Economic efficiency is concerned with
reaching the highest level of economic well-
being. It is achieved through the proper level
of resource utilization and the allocation of
resources for maximum advantage. Economic
theory assumes that individual self-interest is
an important motivating force in human behav-
ior, and that prices act as signals guiding
economic decisions. Public policy can change
relative prices and modify consumptive behavior
by restricting the supply (direct regulation of
floodplain land) or by decreasing demand (tax-
ing floodplain occupancy or subsidizing out-
migration.
Floodplain land may be a valuable resource
and, in some cases, development may be economi-
cally desirable. Alluvial deposition may have
built up rich soil for agriculture, or sand,
gravel, phosphate, or gypsum for mining.
A waterfront location is important for river or
ocean transportation. Historically, urban
centers have developed at strategic locations
along water bodies, creating an impetus for
further growth in the floodplain. Also, the
location may be convenient as a source for in-
expensive irrigation or industrial process
cooling water. Effective floodplain management
must determine how much land development is
economically efficient and at what intensity of
use.
Figure 1 provides a simplified rationale
for economic efficiency in floodplain manage-
ment. The object is to minimize the total
social cost of floodplain management. Total
social cost is the sum of the costs of reloca-
tion and floodproofing, less the cost of
damages avoided by relocation of development,
or the restriction of further development in
the floodplain.
If society as a whole could make the deci-
sion, we would choose an amount of floodplain
use represented by point M at a total social
cost of A. In fact, floodplain land use acti-
vities are now subsidized because the govern-
ment builds flood control projects and bails
out victims of flooded areas. Because of this
subsidy, the sum of damages that floodplain
residents would avoid by staying out of the
floodplain are less than the damages that
society would avoid if the floodplain were pre-
served as open space. As a result, aggregating
economically rational decisions results in more
land development in the floodplain (at a level
represented by point N) and higher total social
costs (equal to point S) . The economically
efficient amount of development (N) could be
achieved by 1) eliminating subsidies, 2) taxing
floodplain occupancy, or 3) subsidizing
relocation out of the floodplain.
FIGURE 1
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Figure 1 captures the main idea behind the
economic approach, but a more detailed analysis
of benefits and costs should be carried out.
We need information to derive probabilities for
the frequency and length of flooding by area,
and also the amount, values, and expected
losses of damageable property within the flood-
plain. Additionally, we must translate into
EFFECTIVE FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT MUST
DETERMINE HOW MUCH LAND DEVELOPMENT IS
ECONOMICALLY EFFICIENT AND AT WHAT
INTENSITY OF USE."
cost figures the expected loss of life and
limb, and the social, environmental, housing,
transportation, employment, health, and
security disruptions. Actually, the same
information is needed to set up a rational sys-
tem of direct regulation like floodplain
zoning. If no floodplain management policies
are implemented, society is making implicit
default estimates of these values.
In a rational world, with an ideally func-
tioning market, "people would suffer [economic]
damage only when every alternative course of a
action was more expensive .... Tney would with-
draw from floodplain locations when expected
damages are greater than or equal to the value
of land .... They would floodproof as long as
the expense is less than or equal to the damage
reduction" (James, 1968:7). Governmental
intervention distorts locational decisions, but
there are also problems with leaving everything
to the market. Individuals may not perceive
risks and benefits properly bacause of a lack
of knowledge or ability to deal with complex
multivariate probability distributions. People
may also have an excessively short time horizon
in mind, or they may deny the hazard
altogether. Individuals may base their deci-
sions about location or floodproofing on
"anchoring behavior" (an excessive reliance on
a small amount of concrete data or previous
experience), or "gambler's fallacy" (what
happened last year is unlikely to reoccur this
year). The poor may be the least likely to be
aware of the extent of the hazards.
THE PROBLEMS OF DIRECT REGULATION
In general, the direct regulatory technique
of floodplain management is not economically
efficient because it ignores differences in the
marginal costs of relocation and floodproofing
among firms and individuals in different loca-
tions and industries. It does not provide a
mechanism for balancing the marginal costs with
the marginal benefits to the company.
From an administrative point of view, the
relative inflexibility of direct regulatory
mechanisms can present several problems.
Because of "grandfather" clauses and other
exemptions included in most land use control
ordinances and enabling legislation, direct
regulation is often ineffective in dealing with
existing problems. Zoning laws in eighteen
states exempt agricultural uses, while enabling
acts in twenty-nine states exempt pre-existing
uses unless they constitute a nuisance (Kusler,
1976:5). Zoning systems are further prone to
irrational variances, which are unfair to other
floodplain landowners and society.
The inflexibility of direct regulation is
also a problem in the achievement of social
equity. It does not preserve the right of
individuals to make their own decisions, nor
does it make direct allowances for reducing the
heavy burdens that it may impose on individuals
--especially the poor. Indeed, direct prohibi-
tion of floodplain residence may increase the
cost of housing by restricting supply, but more
importantly, it may make housing unavailable to
the poor.
A final problem with direct regulation is
that vested interests are likely to oppose re-
gulatory laws, particularly when development is
forbidden. Coalitions of these interests may
be able to apply enough pressure to result in a
weakening of the regulatory effect. Even when
laws are strong, there exist problems with
inspection and monitoring for building codes,
floodproofing requirements, and conformance
to zoning requirements. There may be little
power to impose meaningful sanctions for viola-
tions, and even when the power is available,
individuals and firms may escape by delaying
compliance until the regulatory agency is
overburdened and unable to go through lengthy
legal proceedings.
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH
AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
Economic disincentives can deter or upgrade
the safety of floodplain activities. In paral-
lel, economic incentives for moving out can
decrease the intensity of land uses without
prohibiting residents from continuing the same
activity in the same location. They are simply
penalized or encouraged for behavior depending
on social costs caused by their activities.
When infrastructure is already built up, it may
be more economical to stay in the floodplain
and pay the tax or forego the subsidy. Areas
with some flood hazard may still be the most
desirable locations for certain land uses. As
long as all the benefits of floodplain use
exceed the social costs, and the beneficiaries
of floodplain development bear those costs
rather than taxpayers in general, use of the
floodplain should not be restricted. In short,
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North Carolina's Growing Problem
Steven P. French
While the exact amount of flood-hazard area
in North Carolina is unknown, a reputable 1973
study estimated this area to be 3,652,000
acres, or twelve percent of the total land area
of the state (Goddard, 1973). A total of 174
communities have been identified as flood-
prone by the National Flood Insurance Program.
Based on the number of flood insurance policies
in force in November 1978, North Carolina has
at least 18,647 structures located in flood-
hazard areas.
Traditionally, flooding has been less
serious in North Carolina (and the Southeast,
in general) than in several other parts of the
country. North Carolina did not develop urban
concentrations along major rivers or in
coastal areas around seaports, and the concen-
tration of development in the piedmont area of
the state, where flooding is relatively less
severe, has been a major factor in North
Carolina's past record of small flood losses.
Recent changes in the pattern of develop-
ment, however, are likely to lead to serious
flood problems in the future. The records of
the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
show that there is continuing encroachment by
new development on hazardous areas. In 1977,
the most recent year for which records are
available, 1,927 construction permits were re-
ported for flood hazard areas in North Carolina.
...the concentration of development in
the piedmont area... has been a major
factor in North Carolina's past record
of small flood losses."
Assuming an average value of only $30,000 per
construction permit, this number of permits
represents an investment in hazardous areas of
$57 million in 1977 alone.
NFIP records also indicate that the ser-
iousness of the flood hazard and the rate of
encroachment vary among the regions of the
state. For example, the number of flood
insurance policies issued in the coastal area
(5,034) is more than four times the number in
the Piedmont region (1,183), even though the
Piedmont contains the bulk of the state's
population and urban development. The number
of policies in the coastal area is nearly ten
times greater than those issued in the mountain
area (531), even though the most recent floods
have been in the mountains. If the purchasers
of flood insurance are acting rationally, the
potential flood hazard is considerably more
severe in the coastal area than in the rest of
the state. Additionally, the number of
construction permits issued in hazardous
coastal areas in 1977 was ten times the number
issued in either of the other two regions.
Given that there is a significant amount
of urbanization in hazardous areas in North
Carolina, what are the causes of this problem?
The natural amenities offered by hazard areas
seems to be one of the most important factors.
ACCESSIBILITY TO URBAN SERVICES AND
PROXIMITY TO NATURAL AMENITIES WERE
TWO ADVANTAGES MOST OFTEN CITED IN A
SURVEY OF FL00DPLAIN OCCUPANTS."
A 1971 study found that many floodplain resi-
dents were willing to bear the risk of flooding
to enjoy the perceived advantages of locating
there (James et al., 1971). Accessibility to
urban services and proximity to natural ameni-
ties were two advantages most often cited in a
survey of floodplain occupants. Given the
location of encroachment in hazardous areas of
North Carolina, proximity to natural amenities
would seem to be the major factor.
Flood insurance poses another problem for
controlling the urbanization of flood-hazard
areas. The existence of such insurance may
encourage banks to provide financing that would
otherwise not be available. Furthermore,
underpricing of insurance may encourage un-
desirable urbanization since occupants do not
bear the full cost of their location decisions.
Current methods used to determine flood in-
surance premiums have been questioned. Since
the methods for computing flood probabilities
were developed for riverine flooding, wave and
wind forces may not be accounted for correctly
in calculating premiums for coastal areas. A
study of losses associated with Hurricane
Eloise indicates that actual losses signifi-
cantly exceeded the losses predicted by the
Federal Insurance Administration (Shows, 1977).
The nearly ten thousand flood insurance
policies in emergency program communities in
North Carolina may be stimulating the urbani-
zation of hazardous areas by actually sub-
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sidizing such development in some cases and
by making financing available in others.
The final factor leading to urbanization
of hazardous areas in North Carolina is the
lack of a state program for floodplain manage-
ment. The Floodway Regulation Law adopted in
1971 has never received funding from the state
or federal level (Stewart et al
.
, 1978). This
lack of funding places the entire responsi-
bility for managing and regulating flood
hazards with local government, except in the
coastal areas which are covered by the Coastal
Area Management Act (CAMA) . Even under CAMA,
however, local government has the primary role
in regulating hazard areas; this job is too
difficult for local government to handle alone,
especially considering the fiscal incentives
local government has to increase the property
tax base through new development.
In summary, there has been little or no
effort by state or local government to dis-
courage the trend toward large scale urbani-
zation of flood hazard areas in North Carolina.
Without some form of planned intervention,
flood losses of life and property in North
Carolina can be expected to continue climbing
in the coming years.
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tax and subsidy policy maintains efficient land
uses while discouraging socially unproductive
uses that are also uneconomical to the
entrepreneur.
We can use taxes and subsidies to change an
individual's awareness and perception of flood
hazard, and provide artificial price incentives
for more economically efficient responses.
Taxes should be structured to provide periodic
reminders to floodplain occupants and should be
collected frequently enough so that occupants
can contemplate leaving or floodproof ing;
annual or semi-annual tax payments should
suffice. It must be remembered that if the tax
is too low, the program will not be effective.
Nor should the tax be set so high that it tries
to prevent all potential flood losses, espe-
cially rare, low-probability floods. The 100-
year flood is a generally accepted standard.
As for subsidies, decisions of individuals and
firms to relocate outside the floodplain are
affected more by a one-time payment, since
moving is a one-time event, whereas the deci-
sion to remain is made continuously or at cer-
tain discrete time intervals. Taxes and sub-
sidies may be adjusted until the right levels
are achieved, but they should be stable enough
so that decisions can be made more readily.
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH AND EQUITY
The economic approach allows long-term
residents with sentimental ties to an area to
remain, providing they pay the social costs and
bear the risk for their own decision. Thus,
residents retain more freedom of choice.
Disincentives and incentives are more equitable
than direct regulation because people are not
forced to take specific actions.
Equity is also served because people who
live outside the floodplain are not forced to
pay as much to protect floodplain residents.
This savings occurs even if subsidies are used
to encourage relocation because less money will
be paid out for structural projects, damage,
relief, and rescue expenditures.
If the taxing option is chosen, the tax
burden may go up in the floodplain itself, but
the overall tax burden in the region will go
down. Still more critical from an equity
standpoint, third party taxation of non-flood-
plain residents for the benefit of floodplain
residents will decrease. The burden will fall
on those individuals and firms whose activities
are more closely associated with the flood
hazard. Furthermore, states are relatively
free to impose new tax and subsidy programs on
existing residents.
Economic tools can also be tailor-made to
minimize impacts on those who can bear them the
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least. A tax disincentives program will not
cut the supply of housing as much as stringent
land use regulation, although a tax program
will increase the price. Cash or in-kind pay-
ments could be used to compensate the low in-
come residents. Better still, in terms of the
efficiency and effectiveness goals, subsidies
can be given to these individuals to help them
move out of the floodplain and into decent
housing elsewhere. Tax rates could be set on a
progressive basis or could be subject to mini-
mum income thresholds, or taxes could be com-
bined with subsidies up to a maximum income
level.
Equity may also be of concern to regional
development. Seldom is an entire region in a
floodplain, and development that is periodi-
cally inundated does not go very far in promot-
ing a stable economic base for a less developed
area. It would be to the mutual advantage of
both the residents and outsiders if development
were located outside the floodplain and compen-
sation paid into the area.
Economic disincentives and incentives go a
step beyond the federal flood insurance pro-
gram. Economic measures are set up to account
for spillover costs such as the costs of public
structures and rescue, relief, and rehabilita-
tion rather than just the damages to life,
limb, and property.
Cochrane (1975:111), in evaluating the
current distributive effects of natural
hazards, found that "the federal government
under a wide variety of relief programs seems
to bear a substantial proportion of the loss to
property .... However, this percentage tends to
decline as the severity of the event
[increases]." At the same time, the current
composition of federal programs favors middle
and upper income groups since the poor may not
qualify for government loans. Tax deductions
are also worth more to those in higher tax
brackets, and forgiven loans disproportionately
benefit those with the most wealth at stake.
ECONOMIC TOOLS CAN.,. BE TAILOR-MADE TO
MINIMIZE IMPACTS ON THOSE WHO CAN BEAR
THEM THE LEAST."
If a disproportionate percent of the poor live
in areas subject to the most frequent and
severe catastrophic flood events, they also
bear a larger share of injuries and deaths, and
it is likely that they will be in those loca-
tions due to lower land prices and rents.
Federal aid may be useful in cases where a
flood-prone locality is in a financially de-
pressed region that is unable to impose a
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Structural techniques of flood control are
meeting increasing public opposition.
greater tax burden on residents or fund sub-
sidies. The Corps of Engineers is empowered to
acquire land and relocate buildings and utili-
ties off the floodplain; that may be cheaper
than building a giant impoundment even if the
locality by itself cannot afford the relocation
costs
.
FEASIBILITY OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH
Taxation of floodplain use will encounter
political hostility, but less than that gener-
ated by other tools such as floodplain zoning.
Unless the taxing jurisdiction coincides with
the flood-risk areas, other groups will also
gain from imposition of the tax. General tax-
payers will not have to bear the burden of
taxes for rescue, relief, and rehabilitation if
the tax is set at the proper level and funds
set aside for these purposes. If inefficient
development is pushed out of the floodplain,
the total tax burden should go down.
Unfortunately, people may fail to perceive this
logic and this could have very real political
repercussions
.
A tax system is more flexible to administer
because the rates can be adjusted up or down
more easily and faster than other regulatory
mechanisms. Since floodplain locations shift,
taxes can be adjusted to fit changing natural
conditions or account for the cumulative
effects of small developments. Taxes are also
more flexible as they are not bound by grand-
father clauses.
Taxes or subsidies with rates set according
to explicit legislative criteria are probably
less prone to charges of political bias and
favoritism in administration than is direct
regulation. Tax payments are a matter of pub-
lic record and fewer avenues for variances
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exist with taxes than with zoning. It should
be a simple matter to determine whether the tax
on a parcel has been paid or not. Administra-
tive costs would be low if the tax were tied
into the existing property tax base.
Property taxes do have some intrinsic pro-
blems that result from disparities in services,
differences in size of assessment jurisdic-
tions, the manner in which competent assessment
personnel are employed and trained, the types
and numbers of properties to be valued, and the
state-local governmental relations and
responsibilities (Back, in Lynn, 1976:62).
Due to administrative costs and political
realities, recapture of social costs or pay-
ment of relocation subsidies should be above a
minimum threshold size. At what point should
the tax be collected or subsidy paid out?
There are many possibilities:
1. At the point when public action causes
the event (difficult to determine in
practice unless the event is a very
specific one such as relocation out of
the floodplain)
;
2. Upon sale or transfer of property (harsh
if private losses are incurred before
that time);
3. Upon gift by owner (can lead to
loopholes)
;
4. Upon death of owner (a proxy for sale,
but does not impair real estate trans-
actions, although it also does nothing
about the land use before that time un-
less combined with regulations.
Corporations persist.);
5. Upon attempted bona fide sale at a lower
price if caused by a wipeout or a higher
price if due to a windfall (less harsh,
but prone to abuse);
6. On beginning or completing development
(this option makes a great deal of sense
for a floodplain tax or subsidy system
aimed at reducing development in
critical areas)
;
7. On granting or refusing development per-
mission (even better than option six);
8. Each year or at some stated arbitrary
length of time (this scheme also makes
sense for a floodplain tax or subsidy
program. Taxes would be assessed
several times a year as a reminder of
flood hazard)
.
(flagman and Misczynski,
1978:35-40)
In designing the taxation system, the
sources of political opposition and support
should be identified and the information used
to advantage by the planner. Floodplain resi-
dents or landowners are the most obvious
sources of opposition. Farmers, land holders,
and speculators favor a positive (subsidy) pro-
gram with fewest sanctions for conversion of
undeveloped land. Conservationists favor a
positive program with stiff sanctions for con-
version, or a negative (tax) program with dif-
ferentially high taxes for new and existing
development. In general, subsidy programs are
politically popular and may be difficult to
uproot once enacted; subsidies and preferential
tax assessments are also relatively invisible
and not usually subject to annual budget scru-
tiny, which can be a problem.
James believes that property taxes will not
be used as a major environmental protection
device because:
1. the environment has traditionally been
a common-property resource;
2. divergence of private versus social
costs creates entrenched political
interests;
3. subsidies and grants are more popular;
4. "the tax structure already suffers from
too much social engineering";
5. activities of various levels of govern-
ment would not be affected.
(Lynn, 1976:183)
On the same subject, Haar states that "among
the lessons taught by the American system [of
land use control], perhaps the most valuable
one is that incentives often produce better
results than legislative edicts" (Raker and
McPhee, 1975:57).
TYPES OF LAND USE TAXES
A wide variety of economic disincentives
can be used to guide land use: charges, fees,
assessments, and other instruments lumped to-
gether under the term taxes (although their
legal status varies with the precise type of
system)
. Disincentives may be defined as "a
monetary charge levied by government on conduct
which is not illegal but which does impose
social costs, for the principal purpose of dis-
couraging the conduct" (EPA, 1974:6). Taxes
may be used to guide future development away
from the floodplain or discourage inefficient
uses from staying in. According to Delogu
(1968:673), the system can be set up in more
complex ways to fine-tune the effects if there
is a "hierarchy of undesirable land use situa-
tions and countervailing public actions could
be construed by the legislature and appropriate
tax rates imposed." Taxes also provide a
source of revenues which can be used to coun-
teract adverse impacts of the taxed activities.
Land use taxes can be structured in various
ways. Some examples are:
1. flat rate per acre;
2. variable rate with type of use;
3. variable rate with type of use and
quality of structure;
4. rate dependent on actuarial risk to make
people aware of true costs;
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5. rates set to cover the extra costs of
public services and contingency costs;
6. rate based on population density of re-
sidential use as a proxy for quantifica-
tion of generated externalities;
7. rates adjusted until the amount of
desired change in land use patterns is
achieved.
Some other types of specific disincentives in-
clude special assessments, exactions on devel-
opment permission, impact taxes, sale of
development permission, and transfer taxes.
Special assessments penalize incompatible
uses in a natural hazard area. Although spe-
cial assessments are just the reverse of the
well-accepted preferential assessment tool,
penalty assessments are much more controver-
sial. Special assessments to finance particu-
lar flood control projects or to set aside a
fund for flood relief are generally viewed as
legal and equitable. Special assessments can
be compared to cost-sharing by the beneficiar-
ies of flood control works or relief programs.
When special assessments are used, closer
scrutiny over the exact benefits and costs of
a proposal can be expected. It is easier to
base assessments on cost allocations because
benefits are uncertain as they are dependent
on when a flood occurs.
Exactions on development permission are
charges imposed with subdivision requests, re-
zonings, conditional use permits, variances, or
building permits. The legality of exactions
varies with state and local law, but the trend
is toward acceptance of exactions when the
amount paid is less than the gains from
development (Hagman and Misczynski, 1978:
xxvii)
.
Impact taxes are applied later in the de-
velopment sequence than exactions and are meant
to pay for needed public facilities and ser-
vices. In some cases, the cost of servicing
floodplains will be greater than flood-free
areas; for example, stronger water pipes must
"RELOCATING EXISTING LAND USE IS
ESPECIALLY DESIRABLE WHEN THE RISK
OF FLOODS OR COST OF CONTROL WORKS IS
VERY HIGH."
be used. According to Hagman and Misczynski
(1978:xxvii), "Impact taxes do not enjoy the
same legal acceptance as exactions .... [but]
may be more appropriate as general windfall
recapture devices than exactions are."
Sale of development permission is related
to contract zoning. Regulatory permits are
issued in exchange for certain monetary or
other considerations. In the extreme, this may
be construed as sale of a license to violate a
land use regulation, which is illegal.
Although the theoretical price would equal the
net social loss from granting development per-
mission, this method may have some loopholes.
Hagman and Misczynski (1968:xxxviii) point out
that speculators might buy up development per-
missions and officials might end up "playing
a real game of monopoly rather than. . .adminis-
tering a public trust," and further that "no
court has ever approved a sale of the right to
regulate. Therefore a permission would be sub-
ject to subsequent regulation even by the con-
tracting government.™
Transfer taxes are sales taxes paid upon
sale or gift of land. They may be ad valorem
taxes based on a percent of the value with
fixed or sliding rates or may be levied on in-
creases in land value. If high enough, these
taxes will affect a buyer's decision to locate
in the floodplain. However, transfer taxes
also have the dual effect of discouraging cur-
rent residents from moving out. Unscrupulous
businessmen may even evade the law by setting
up dummy corporations and claim that no sale
or gift has taken place.
TYPES OF SUBSIDIES
The purpose of land use subsidies for the
floodplain are to preserve compatible uses and
encourage elimination of incompatible uses.
Subsidies may be outright grants, low interest
loans, special tax benefits, or other compen-
satory schemes such as transfer of development
rights.
Relocating existing land use is especially
desirable when the risk of floods or cost of
control works is very high. Although reloca-
tion subsidies have been seriously proposed for
Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin, they have not been
extensively used (Kusler, 1976:118). If a sub-
sidy program is voluntary, people will only
accept the subsidies when they perceive it to
be their interest to do so. Alternatively,
relief programs could be designed to reward
people who move out of an area after a flood
hits.
Governments should also investigate the use
of direct payments, loans, or tax credits for
floodproofing. Tax credits are more equitable
than deductions, which are less valuable to
lower income groups.
Easement purchase or differential tax
assessments can be used by governments to re-
duce development pressure on floodplain land in
agricultural or open space areas. Easements
and differential assessments are well accepted
tools in almost all states. Differential
assessment increases the profitability of farm
use and reduces carrying costs on open space.
For this reason, differential assessment must
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be combined with land use regulation or econo-
mic disincentives on development to prevent
sprawl caused by market postponement of con-
version aided by tax shelters.
There are three types of differential
assessment programs. The first, preferential
assessment, bases the value for tax purposes on
current use and not the "best and highest
possible use." Because there is no penalty for
later conversion to other uses, this tool can
only modify the rate of development of the
floodplain.
deferred taxation is similar to preferen-
tial assessment, but back taxes must be paid if
the agricultural or open space is developed.
Clearly, unless the penalty is severe, back
taxes are such a small part of development
costs that delays in conversion are only
temporary.
Restrictive agreements are voluntary con-
tracts between land owners and governments to
keep land in a particular use for stated
periods of time in return for lower tax assess-
ments. Generally, the tax differential plus
interest and a penalty must be paid if the
agreement is broken. Sometimes, long advance
notice is also required before development is
allowed. Restrictive agreements are more com-
plex to administer than deferred taxation be-
cause contracts are individually negotiated.
They can, however, be applied more selectively.
Another incentive/disincentive technique
for development control is that of zoning by
special assessment financed by eminent domain.
Landowners in restrictive zones are compensated
by receipts from special assessments on land-
owners outside the floodplain whose property
increases in value due to supply restriction.
This is an old technique which has been upheld
in the courts, but is now infrequently used.
THE LEGALITY OF NON-UNIFORM TAXATION
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution requires equal protection and due
process of law for all citizens of a state.
Equal protection does not imply equal treatment
of all individuals. It does mean that govern-
ments must weigh public and private interests
and make decisions on a reasonable basis. Non-
uniform taxes based on location inside versus
outside the floodplain do not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. If the entire local
jurisdiction is inside the floodplain, the
locality is not confronted with accusations of
discriminatory taxing unless it sets multiple
rates for different segments of the floodplain
according to specific hazard potential.
Unfortunately, a locality entirely within the
floodplain would be risking a competitive dis-
advantage compared to its neighbors in and out
l«(wr <J: St
In severe floods, structures can end up as
debris and add to erosive scouring.
of the floodplain. Thus, the locality is not
likely to undertake a taxation policy on its
own, unless it has already reached its desired
total level of growth or cooperates with all
localities within a region on a floodplain
management program.
There are precedents, however, for using
taxes to discourage undesirable behavior.
State and federal taxes are already being used
to provide economic disincentives against
behavior which is harmful to individuals and
the environment. Sumptuary taxes on drugs,
firearms, gambling, and alcohol, for example,
are widespread, and are not considered viola-
tions of equal protection requirements.
Most state constitutions prohibit use of
public funds for direct private gifts. A sub-
sidy tied to a desired action is not a gift.
However, if just the poor received relocation
subsidies and the rest of the inhabitants have
to pay floodplain occupancy taxes, there may be
accusations of unequal treatment. If "simi-
larly situated" is interpreted the same way it
is for the progressive income tax, there would
be no problem.
The exact wording of state constitutions
and the implied connotations have a good deal
of bearing on court acceptance of tax classifi-
cations. Most states have some kind of consti-
tutional clause relating to uniformity of the
property tax structure. These clauses can be
divided into ten groups:
1. "Property shall be taxed according to
its value." (Arkansas, Maine, and
Tennessee)
2. "Property shall be taxed in proportion
to its value." (Alabama, California,
Illinois, and Nebraska)
3. "The legislature may impose proportional
and reasonable assessments, rates, and
taxes upon all persons and estates."
(Massachusetts, New Hampshire)
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4. "There shall be a uniform rule of
taxation." (Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio,
and Wisconsin)
5. "Taxation shall be equal and uniform."
(Mississippi, Texas, West Virginia, and
Wyoming)
6. "The legislature shall provide by law
for a uniform and equal rate of assess-
ment and taxation." (Florida, Indiana,
Kansas, Nevada, South Carolina, and
Vermont)
7. "Taxes shall be uniform upon the same
class of subjects." (Colorado, Delaware,
Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia)
8. "Taxes shall be uniform upon the same
class of property." (Arizona
Maryland, North Carolina, North Dakota,
South Dakota, and Washington)
9. "There shall be a fair distribution of
the expense of government." (Rhode
Island and Vermont)
10. No uniformity clause directly pertaining
to taxation. (Connecticut, Iowa, and
New York) (Newhouse, 1959:9-16)
In general, there is more flexibility in
tax classifications than first meets the eye.
Uniform rules imply classifications are accept-
able. Often, careful creation of tax districts
can circumvent possible problems. The most re-
strictive situation occurs in categories five
and six, which outlaw taxation that is not
equal and uniform.
In North Carolina, the General Assembly may
classify real property for different tax rates.
Presumably, it could place floodplain land in a
separate category. However, this power cannot
be delegated to cities and counties to set up
their own classifications themselves (Brower
et al., 1974:80).
Another possibility is designation of urban
and rural service districts. A tax break could
be given on land in the floodplain if the gov-
ernmental unit refuses to extend services
there. This tax subsidy may backfire and en-
courage development if the service boundary is
not taken seriously by developers and the
government; it is best used in conjunction with
regulations.
A MIXED STRATEGY
Now that the case has been made for an
economic approach, it can also be mentioned
that economic incentives, direct regulation,
and structural control are not mutually exclu-
sive tools. They can be integrated to provide
effective floodplain management. Additionally,
a mixed strategy is safer if there are doubts
about the legality of a particular element of
the overall plan.
A minimum level of effectiveness can be
ensured by overlaying the various approaches.
If taxes and subsidies are set too low, zoning
and building codes can guarantee some desired
level of land use control. Further, zoning, by
itself, may be useless for modifying existing
uses rapidly, while taxes and subsidies alone
may not be able to change locational prefer-
ences quickly. Land use locational decisions
are a long time in the making and involve
habitual behavior; we do not know the relative
elasticities of responses to taxes and
subsidies.
An integrated approach might also be useful
in a rapid growth situation. Since they can be
set into action quickly, taxes are well suited
for use in an interim control program until a
comprehensive plan or regulatory guidance sys-
tem can be prepared or expanded.
...ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, DIRECT
REGULATION, AND STRUCTURAL CONTROL
ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE TOOLS."
With moderately high taxes and subsidies,
in combination with land use controls, the
efficiency and equity advantages of the eco-
nomic approach can be substantially preserved.
A mixed strategy is, therefore, not as incon-
sistent as it may seem at first, and is pro-
bably the best strategy for practical experi-
ments with innovative policies.
CONCLUSION
Flood losses are increasing, despite expen-
sive structural flood control works because of
exogenous development pressures undampened by
effective land use guidance. Direct regulation
of land use has been largely ineffective and is
hindered by special treatment of existing uses
and by proliferation of variances. It is time
to experiment with a different approach depend-
ing most heavily on economic incentives and
disincentives, in addition to regulation and
structural control if necessary.
It does not make economic sense to prohibit
all use of the floodplain. Taxes and subsidies
can be set up, at least in theory, to encourage
the socially desirable level and types of acti-
vities appropriate for the floodplain. It is
economically efficient to bear some risk and
provide a certain degree of floodproofing, in-
cluding structural controls. Aside from being
more efficient, the economic approach is also
more equitable. Disincentives and incentives
do not force anyone to avoid or leave the
floodplain. Instead, floodplain residents must
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pay the full costs of their locational deci-
sion, including spillover costs and environ-
mental damage. Often, people are unaware of
the true dangers facing them and society can
bring the risks to their attention with the
periodic reminder of a tax bill.
Still, political opposition to any strong
floodplain land use guidance system can be
expected because of the power of special inter-
est groups, even though society as a whole
would be better off. Legality depends on spe-
cific requirements of states and localities and
the program design. Regulatory taxes based on
reasonable criteria are likely to be upheld.
There are many varieties of taxes and sub-
sidies which can be investigated. Each form
has its own particular intended and unintended
consequences. The best floodplain program may
be a combination of taxes, subsidies, regula-
tions, and structural control.
"Planners have little to lose in
advocating that the floodplain taxes
and subsidies reach the public agenda
as a serious alternative."
It is true that because the use of taxes
and subsidies is innovative, we have little
real world data on their effectiveness in con-
trolling land use. The lack of experience is
an advantage as well as a problem. These tools
are riskier to attempt, but give the planner
more room to experiment. At any rate, previous
flood control policies can be safely judged a
failure. Planners have little to lose in
advocating that the floodplain taxes and sub-
sidies reach the public agenda as a serious
alternative.
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